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A deliberative model of intra-party democracy  *
FABIO WOLKENSTEIN 
Political Science, London School of Economics and Political Science 
I. INTRODUCTION: PARTIES AND LINKAGE 
Political parties serve a number of important functions in representative democracies. 
Connecting citizens to government is perhaps the most important one. This is how parties 
were traditionally conceived, and it continues to be the main standard according to which 
their legitimacy as representative institutions is evaluated.   1
 Intra-party democracy is instrumental in establishing and sustaining this connection 
between society and government. Internally democratic parties empower the members on the 
ground, who have privileged access to the demands of the constituents, and provide them 
with opportunities to channel these demands into policy decisions.  2
Earlier versions of this article were presented in workshops at the LSE, the universities of Western Bohemia in *
Plzeň and Lucerne, as well as at Sciences Po Paris and the Royal Society of Edinburgh. I thank André 
Bächtiger, Simon Beste, Gideon Calder, Maurits De Jongh, Charles Girard, Lilia Giugni, Simon 
Glendinning, Volkan Gül, Andrew Knops, Jenny Mansbridge, Giulia Pastorella, Carmen Pavel, and 
Sanna Salo for incisive and generous comments on these occasions. The article has also greatly benefited 
from exchanges with Cecilia Bruzelius, Charlotte Haberstroh, Lise Herman, Abby Innes, Jakob Kapeller, 
Mareike Kleine, Christina Maria Koch, and Jonathan White. My thanks to them for engaging with my 
work. Finally, I am grateful to the two anonymous referees of the JPP for their extensive and extremely 
helpful comments.
As Sartori (1976, p. ix) put it more than a quarter century ago, “parties are the central intermediate and 1
intermediary structure between society and government.” This understanding of parties continues to 
inform scholars’ normative judgments about parties. See, for example, Biezen and Saward (2008); Dalton 
et al. (2011); Mair (2013b).
For a classic statement on this “linkage” function of parties, see Lawson (1988).2
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 In this article, I begin by arguing that existing models of intra-party democracy—
which focus on candidate selection and direct participation, respectively—are not adequate to 
the task of linking citizens to government. I suggest that these models run the risk of simply 
reinforcing the preferences of the party elite, thus weakening, instead of strengthening, the 
members on the ground. Missing from these models are fora of discussion and debate, in 
which the party base can critically question the status quo and devise alternative positions on 
specific policies as well as the party’s more general direction. It is these fora parties need to 
establish and empower to make internal democracy meaningful. 
 With this in mind, I then outline a deliberative model of intra-party democracy.  At 3
the centre of this model stand processes of preference-formation at the partisan base, in 
particular the deliberations of local party branches. I argue first that these traditional sites of 
partisan activism provide favourable circumstances for good quality deliberation, and go on 
to examine several ways in which their deliberations could be connected to decisions. Also I 
suggest a set of novel institutional designs practitioners can avail themselves of if 
conventional channels of preference transmission are defective. In closing, I run several 
objections the model faces and show that they are less weighty than might at first appear. 
II. WHY A DELIBERATIVE MODEL OF INTRA-PARTY DEMOCRACY? 
A. Two models of intra-party democracy 
References to the possibility of such a model have surfaced on a few occasions in the relevant theoretical 3
literature (see Cohen 1989; Teorell 1999; Biezen and Saward 2008; White and Ypi 2011), but a 
systematic treatment has not emerged yet.
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To see the relative merits of a deliberative model of intra-party democracy, it is necessary 
first to audit the main alternatives to it: the candidate selection model and the direct 
participation model. These are the two standard models of intra-party democracy. In this 
section I show that these models are, by themselves, inadequate. They bracket out processes 
of preference-formation, which has adverse implications for the capacity of parties to link 
citizens to political decisions.   
 Consider first the candidate selection model. In recent times, this has become perhaps 
the most popular model of intra-party democracy. The basic idea underlying it is that the 
procedures of selecting who will gain a place on the party list should be preferably inclusive 
and provide a large number of members with an opportunity to voice their preferences.  4
Some add to this the rider that candidate selection procedures should also be reasonably 
competitive and designed in such a way as to ensure that women’s descriptive representation 
on the final party lists is adequate. 
 This model is problematic for at least two reasons. First, for many active party 
members, it may simply not provide a meaningful enough channel of participation. Of 
course, party members will generally be favourably inclined towards taking part in candidate 
selection processes, especially if these processes are the only opportunity for them to exercise 
voice. But those members who want to engage on a more regular basis are likely to become 
disenchanted when internal participation involves only candidate selection. The obvious 
problem with this is that it is usually these active and committed party members that sustain 
the party’s ties to the citizenry. They engage in door-to-door campaigning, organise events for 
the local community and meet regularly with other partisans to discuss the community’s most 
For a summary treatment, see Hazan and Rahat (2010).4
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pressing problems, thus having a heightened awareness of citizens’ concerns. Thus to connect 
the party with the citizenry in large, a model of intra-party democracy must offer its active 
members more substantial participatory opportunities. 
 The second problem the candidate selection model holds is that it treats members’ 
preferences as simply given. I want to set aside this problem for the time being and return to 
it after outlining the second standard model of intra-party democracy, since this problem 
affects the second model as well. 
 The second standard model of intra-party democracy focuses on direct participation. 
This model of intra-party democracy operates with a much “thicker” conception of 
participation than the candidate selection model. It holds that, rather than indirectly 
influencing the party’s decision making through selecting candidates, party members should 
be able to translate their preferences directly into decisions.  
 The most common form of direct intra-party democracy are membership ballots, in 
which policy or personnel questions (which are usually pre-selected by the party leadership) 
are referred to the members for a direct decision. Since the mid-1990s, parties across the 
democratic world increasingly made use of such ballots.  Another well-known example of 5
direct participation within parties are “rotation schemes” for MPs. In the 1980s, the German 
Greens have experimented with such schemes. The idea was to limit the term of office to two 
years (two years less than the full legislative term of four years) in order to “prevent the 
estrangement of MPs from their grass roots,”  and to give more people the opportunity to 6
directly influence policy-making processes. 
Scarrow 2014, pp. 181–5.5
Poguntke 1992, p. 244; also see Scarrow 1999.6
!4
 Although the direct participation model grants party members more influence than the 
candidate selection model, it holds a number of problems that make it ill-suited as a self-
standing model of intra-party democracy. If a party adopts rotation system for office holders, 
the lack of expertise of those who have just been propelled into office may place 
disproportionate power in the hands of experts who lack democratic authorisation. Thomas 
Poguntke has noted this problem in a study of the German Greens: “[A] high turnover of MPs 
means that the informal power of permanently employed parliamentary assistants, who can 
rely on accumulated knowledge of parliamentary procedures, is likely to rise. Hence, rotation 
may lead to the situation where functional oligarchies replace democratically legitimized 
power centres.”  Ultimately, this of course weakens, rather than empowers, party members. 7
 Membership ballots, on the other hand, may cause a problem of disaffection similar to 
the one I have highlighted in the context of the candidate selection model. Here is why. In 
intra-party referenda, the agenda-setter and the initiator are often the same actor, namely the 
party elite.  So the party elite controls both the question that is referred to the members for a 8
decision and the timing of the referendum. This lack of control over the terms on which the 
referendum is held may dishearten those members who want to have more substantial 
influence. Active and organised members might demand a right to initiate referenda 
themselves, for example. Where they already have such a right, they may want to be offered 
more channels to promote their cause.  9
Poguntke 1992, p. 243.7
Sussmann 2007.8
Notice that many parties have enacted statutory reforms to provide party members with the formal right to 9
initiate an internal referendum. But whether such formal rights outweigh the power of the party elite to 
shape the internal agenda is far from clear. See, for example, Detterbeck’s (2013) study of membership 
ballots in German parties.
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 Furthermore, there is also a normative problem with the direct participation model, 
namely that it presumes that only the act of expressing one’s preferences is normatively and 
practically relevant. Indeed, the direct participation model does not valorise the process of 
preference-formation prior to the decision. Instead, people’s views and preferences are treated 
as simply “out there.” As I have mentioned earlier, this problem affects also the candidate 
selection model. Both the candidate selection model and the direct participation model draw 
on concepts of participation which revolve around expressing preferences, but ignore the 
processes through which preferences come into being.  10
 Why exactly is this problematic? Primarily because it undermines the democratic 
potential of intra-party democracy. Democratic theorists widely criticise such “aggregative” 
conceptions of democracy, arguing that taking preferences as given risks cementing the 
existing state of affairs.  Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson put the classic worry in this 11
way: “By taking existing or minimally corrected preferences as given, as the base line for 
collective decisions, the aggregative conception [of democracy] fundamentally accepts and 
may even reinforce existing distributions of power in society.”  It’s main shortcoming, they 12
argue, is that it does “not provide any process by which citizens’ views about those 
distributions might be changed.”  13
 To understand this point, consider the potentially problematic effect of involving the 
whole party membership, rather than just the active party members, in candidate selection 
procedures. Evidence suggests that making candidate selection thus inclusive ultimately 
Teorell 2006.10
Cohen 1989; Gutmann and Thompson 2004; Mansbridge et al. 2010.11
Gutmann and Thompson 2004, p. 16.12
Ibid.13
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buttresses the party leaderships’ power, since it strengthens those large groups of passive 
members who are “at once more docile and more likely to endorse the candidates proposed 
by the party leadership.”  Contrary to the active members, who deliberate with their partisan 14
peers, those passive members are not provided with an opportunity to jointly debate and 
question the leadership’s candidate choices. As a result, they are usually more inclined to 
uncritically accept these choices.  (Notice, however, that the problem here is not the 15
candidate selection procedure’s inclusiveness per se, but the lack of opportunities for non-
organised members to deliberate.) 
 If this is correct, it should give proponents of the standard models of intra-party 
democracy pause. Intra-party democracy becomes obsolete as a means of bringing citizens 
closer to government when it merely serves to legitimise the party leadership’s position. This 
is the main deficiency of the two dominant models of intra-party democracy and the 
institutions they prescribe. 
 A closely related problem is that the methods of preference-expression we have 
auditioned so far—candidate selection and direct participation—hardly provide ways to 
challenge these methods themselves. In membership ballots, for example, it is not possible to 
express a preference for using a different method of decision-making to deal with the issue at 
stake.  Perhaps members think that a ballot is not the appropriate way to resolve the issue: 16
they might think, for instance, that a yes/no referendum on a divisive issue could undermine 
Mair 1997, p. 149. For an in-depth empirical study of these problems in parties in Great Britain and Spain, see 14
Hopkin (2001). 
Katz and Mair 2009, p. 759.15
Gutmann and Thompson 2004, pp. 16–7.16
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party cohesion. But the ballot itself does not provide opportunities to raise these concerns and 
propose a different decision-making process. 
 Candidate selection methods equally fail to provide a process through which their 
own configurations can be challenged. Who is included in the selectorate, for example, is a 
decision that needs to be made prior to the actual selection process. In practice, this decision 
is usually made in top-down fashion by the party elite.  Members hardly have a say here, 17
thus being effectively excluded from deciding on the terms of the decision-making process 
they are supposed to participate in at a later stage. 
 In sum, the candidate selection and direct participation models of intra-party 
democracy are concerned only with participation qua expressing views and preferences, but 
provide no room for participation qua forming views and preferences. This limits their 
democratic potential in important ways. What we need is a corrective to the limitations of 
these models. 
B. Deliberation as corrective and complement 
A possible way forward is to shift the centre of gravity from processes in which preferences 
are expressed and aggregated to processes of preference-formation and clarification. Most 
important amongst these processes is deliberation. Deliberation is a practice that involves 
jointly engaging in discursive exchanges about specific issues. It is about finding agreements 
on, or getting clear about the nature and depth of disagreement over, these issues in 
conversation with others. All this presupposes that people’s positions and perspectives are, at 
 For an in-depth case study of British parties, see Mikulska and Scarrow (2010).17
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least to some degree, open to reassessment and revision. In this sense, deliberation is 
transformative in its aspirations: a procedure to question, rather than reinforce, the status quo. 
This distinguishes it from the forms of “preference-expressing” participation we have 
considered thus far. 
 When we think about deliberation within political parties what naturally comes to 
mind are internal debates over ideology, policy, and personnel. We think perhaps also of party 
conferences, in which party elites give speeches and ordinary members respond. And 
possibly we think also of everyday discussions among partisans, informal encounters where 
they talk about politics with their peers. Taken together, these and other intra-party 
deliberations form a complex arrangement of discursive interactions, a “deliberative system” 
in which each component performs different roles.  Not all of the system’s components are 18
connected to decision-making procedures, and the quality of deliberation they produce will 
be very different. But each component contributes to a larger deliberative whole. 
 The main aim of a deliberative model of intra-party democracy would be to 
coordinate the party’s internal discussions and debates in such a way that the members on the 
ground are more connected to policy decisions. It appears that three things must here be 
achieved:  
(a) First, that members on the ground deliberate about issues of common concern, and 
that they deliberate well;  
On the systemic approach to deliberative democracy, see the programmatic statement by Mansbridge et al. 18
(2012).
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(b) second, that the preferences and opinions these deliberations generate are transmitted 
to the party elite, either face-to-face or (more likely so) through democratically elected 
delegates;  
(c) and third, that party elites and ordinary members engage in regular discussions where 
they explain to each other the reasons for why they think as they do, actualising what one 
may call “deliberative accountability.”  19
Before looking at the model’s different components, several clarifications about the nature of 
this model are in order. First, the deliberative model would not wholly replace candidate 
selection processes or occasional direct-democratic initiatives, for these practices serve 
important functions in parties that deliberation by itself cannot serve. (It is, for example, a 
practical necessity in representative democracies that parties compose lists of candidates for 
election; and membership ballots can be useful in helping parties to increase the formal 
legitimacy of their decisions.) The point of the deliberative model is that it (a) corrects for the 
tendency of these practices to cement the status quo, and (b) complements these practices 
with participatory venues that emphasise discussion and debate. By offering new 
opportunities to exercise voice, it can also counteract members’ disaffection with the meagre 
opportunities for participation that the candidate selection and direct participation models 
provide. 
It might be objected here that some of the just-sketched discursive interactions are already implied in existing 19
conceptions of intra-party democracy. For example, in practice candidate selection processes are likely to 
involve deliberations among members concerning the strengths and weaknesses of different candidates 
and their agendas. However, none of these interactions are recognised as normatively desirable or 
practically relevant in existing articulations of these models. It is the distinctive feature of a deliberative 
model of intra-party democracy that it is sensitive to the broader significance of these discursive 
interactions.
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 The second issue that needs to be clarified concerns the main protagonists in the 
model. Why does the deliberative model of intra-party democracy centre on the deliberations 
of the “party on the ground”? Recall in this connection the linkage function of intra-party 
democracy that was mentioned in the introduction to this article. To connect citizens and 
government, parties ought to empower first and foremost ordinary members and activists, 
who are directly in touch with the rest of the society.  This means essentially that members 20
at the partisan base need be given adequate power to influence the party leadership. Although 
this does not preclude two-way communication between the party elite and the wider 
membership, it does involve placing limits on the discretion of party elites. Institutional 
designs must aim at neutralising power asymmetries. (I return to this point in section IV.) 
 Notice, however, that a deliberative model of intra-party democracy naturally engages 
a more agentive conception of linkage than is conventionally deployed. The traditional idea 
underlying linkage is, to repeat, that grassroots activists and ordinary members have 
privileged access to the demands and concerns of the party’s constituents, and should be 
empowered so as to channel these demands and concerns into decisions over policy or the 
party’s more general direction.  Party members are meant to serve as messengers or 21
delegates of the constituents in this view. In the deliberative model, by contrast, the emphasis 
is not only on channelling the inputs of citizens into the party, but also, and more strongly so, 
on processing these inputs discursively by pooling relevant arguments and specifying 
interpretations in discussions and debates. Thus party members are not merely messengers, 
Lawson 1988; Michels [1911] 1989. Note that many party scholars working with neo-Schumpeterian concepts 20
of democracy like Dalton et al. (2011) often bracket out this function of parties. Justifying these moves is 
the assumption that the party equals party elite. Party members only come into play in candidate 
selection procedures (and perhaps in pre-election mobilising efforts) in this perspective.
Lawson 1988.21
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but deliberative agents who jointly subject the information provided by citizens to critical 
scrutiny. 
 In the next section, I look more closely at deliberation at the party base. In a later 
section, I discuss how these deliberations can be connected to decision-making authority, and 
how decision makers can be held accountable. Before proceeding though, it should be 
mentioned that less than a decade ago the idea that parties should be treated as sites of 
deliberation would have sounded somewhat controversial to democratic theorists. For a long 
time, advocates of deliberative democracy regarded deliberation as incompatible with 
partisanship, the worry being that partisans are incapable of changing their minds because of 
their strong cognitive bias—or because they are in any case more interested in promoting 
their own sectarian interests than in engaging in reasoned discussion about common ends.  22
However, as deliberative theorists increasingly shifted the focus of their theories “from an 
ideal conception of the political to the phenomenological,”  an opening for partisanship was 23
created. 
 There are several ways of looking at partisanship that see it as compatible with 
democratic deliberation, two of which are directly relevant for the argument put forth here. 
One stresses that partisanship is deliberative to the extent that it is “ethical.” Ethical partisans, 
writes Nancy Rosenblum, reject the “uncompromising extremism” that glorifies 
“intransigence as an avowed good.”  They are aware that their own perspective is partial and 24
For an excellent synthetic discussion, see Muirhead (2010). For contributions that address the (limited) 22
compatibility of partisanship and democratic deliberation, see Gundersen (2000); Williams (2000); 
Hendriks et al. (2007).
Bächtiger et al. 2010, p. 42. Key theoretical statements include Young (2002); Mansbridge et al. (2010) and 23
Azmanova (2012).
Rosenblum 2008, p. 402; Muirhead 2006.24
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acknowledge that others, even within their own party, might reasonably disagree with them. 
Despite their strong attachment to particular ideas, they defend their views with great respect 
for the other side and exhibit a disposition to listen and compromise (which presupposes that 
they relax the intensity with which they hold their views). This makes respectful and 
constructive debates possible, and facilitates reaching prudential and widely accepted 
outcomes—goals on which most deliberative democrats place high value.  25
 Another argument holds that even if partisans do not always meet the standards of 
good quality deliberation, this is no reason for concern. For once we accept that a party forms 
a self-standing deliberative system, we also need to acknowledge that the failures of one of 
its parts to produce good deliberation can be compensated for by another part if the individual 
parts are “concatenated in the right way.”  If, for example, a group of members at the party 26
base polarises over an issue, this is likely to be the result of bad quality deliberation, where 
views are reinforced without weighing alternative arguments. But polarisation may help put 
the demands of this group on the agenda of other party groups and party elites, and these can 
critically re-examine those demands in their own deliberations. So, the interaction between 
different deliberative agents within the party can raise the overall systemic deliberative 
quality. 
III. DELIBERATION AND THE PARTY ON THE GROUND 
With this preliminary outline of a deliberative model of intra-party democracy in place, we 
are now in a position to look more closely at its individual components. Most important 
Gutmann and Thompson 2010, on ethical partisanship see esp. pp. 1134–7.25
Goodin 2008, p. 186.26
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amongst these are, as I have argued, the deliberations of the party base. But what precisely is 
the “party base”? Which of the numerous organisations and participatory venues one 
typically finds at the bottom of the party hierarchy should be included in a deliberative model 
of intra-party democracy? This is the first question I want to address in this section. 
 The answer to this question will depend first on the extent to which a given party 
grassroots organisation is connected to the wider citizenry and second on its capacity to 
produce good quality deliberation. If it satisfies these two desiderata—connectedness to the 
citizenry and deliberative capacity—then it may be integrated into the deliberative model. 
My contention is that it is only local party branches which, in virtue of their design as 
inclusive participatory institutions and their members’ commitment to discussion with like-
minded partisans, satisfy these desiderata. Alternative grassroots fora may satisfy one of the 
two, but not both, desiderata. 
 We can proceed by a process of elimination here. Milieu organisations, such as party 
academies or partisan sports clubs, traditionally played a crucial role in connecting parties 
with their supporters. They offered opportunities for partisans to socialise with like-minded 
people, thereby functioning as sites of political identity formation. The problem with these 
organisations is that they exist only in very limited form today. As a result of falling levels of 
party identification, milieu organisations have diminished to the point of insignificance in 
most Western democracies.  So regardless of whether they satisfy the desiderata—where 27
they still exist, they almost certainly satisfy the connectedness desideratum—including them 
in a deliberative model of intra-party democracy is hardly a fruitful direction. We need to 
look for more vibrant sites of partisan engagement. 
Scarrow 2014, p. 162.27
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 Might the various online platforms through which parties involve their membership 
base be a good place to look for ordinary party members who are willing to debate? In recent 
times, parties have increasingly tried to offer members opportunities for online 
participation.  The target of these initiatives are partisans who want to interact with a 28
political party but commit as little as possible to it—partisans, that is, who do not want to 
regularly meet on a face-to-face basis with other partisans, and thus look for “ad hoc 
engagement” with few costs and obligations.  To cite just one example of such a partisan 29
online platform, the British Labour party’s consultative forum Your Britain.org.uk allows 
members (as well as non-members) to communicate their ideas on how Labour policy should 
look in the future. The format of communication are online posts, which are collected and 
thematically organised by the website’s administrators. 
 Insofar as online platforms of this kind give citizens easy access to political parties, 
they in principle have the potential to link parties and society. Thus they are likely to satisfy 
the connectedness desideratum. Their deliberative credentials are, however, questionable. 
This is principally because they work on a no-commitment basis: people can vent their ideas 
and log off. There is no requirement to justify one’s statements and claims, nor will 
participants be inclined to respond to others’ concerns. Coleman has observed this in 
Labour’s 2003 Big Conversation online consultation exercise, the predecessor to Your 
Britain: “[N]obody responds to what anyone else has said, rather like a phone-in programme 
Recent empirical studies reveal a considerable change of party structures. Scarrow (2014) speaks in this 28
context of “multi-speed memberships parties,” in which a range of different membership options are 
offered.
Gauja 2015, p. 94. 29
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in which caller after caller makes a short speech and then disappears into the ether.”  Online 30
fora of this kind, he concluded, “lack any scope for interactivity.”   31
 Thus, partisan online platforms seem ill-suited as basic building blocks of a 
deliberative model of intra-party democracy.  For like any conversation, deliberation 32
presupposes a level of interactivity. It requires people to give and hear reasons in a way that 
makes plain the respect citizens ought to have and express for one another even when they 
disagree. In this sense, deliberation is not a “no-commitment” activity. People must be 
willing to invest time and intellectual resources in formulating arguments and engaging with 
others’ viewpoints. While this might be a lot to ask from many ordinary citizens, for some 
party members it is part and parcel of their political engagement. The party members I have 
in mind are those who regularly engage on a face-to-face basis with other partisans, 
discussing politics and devising political proposals. It is those members that the deliberative 
model of intra-party democracy revolves around. 
 Where might those members be found? Typically they are organised in local party 
branches. In most parties (that is, in most developed democracies other than the U.S., where 
parties are quite differently organised)  local branches are the smallest cells of party 33
Coleman 2004, p. 117.30
Ibid.31
Research on party blogs shows that committed online discussion can certainly occur in a partisan context 32
(Gibson et al. 2012). The problem is that participants in these discussions are almost exclusively 
partisans of the same stripe; non-partisans rarely join the debate. Thus these discussions probably don’t 
satisfy the connectedness desideratum.
Note that I do not mean to suggest that US parties could not draw on internal deliberative institutions. 33
Although US parties have no direct equivalent to party branches, their “county committees” serve similar 
local-level functions as party branches. Thus they might exhibit similar deliberative characteristics as 
party branches. This issue must, of course, be settled empirically and cannot be discussed more here.
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organisation.  They consist of groups of members who meet in regular intervals to discuss 34
politics and coordinate party activities in their local community, including door-to-door 
campaigning, organising party events, and providing political information to citizens.  The 35
members who attend these meetings usually hold a strong commitment to the party, and 
voluntarily spend considerable amounts of time engaging in grassroots politics. 
 Party branches, as I said, satisfy our desiderata of connectedness and deliberative 
capacity. First, party branches are closely linked to the local communities in which their 
members are based. They are directly in touch with the local constituency, and have the 
authority to delegate representatives to hierarchically higher party bodies to make these 
concerns heard.  (I will say more about delegation in section IV.) For many aspiring party 36
members, moreover, branches provide the starting gate for their politically active life. Where 
they exist, they are the primary contact point for those who want to engage in the party. They 
allow citizens to get to know other like-minded partisans and participate in a range of 
activities with them. Thus, although their vibrancy has decreased as party membership figures 
fell over the previous decades, they are still crucial for sustaining the party’s roots in 
society.  37
 Second, local party branches are, as it were, “natural” deliberative fora. Deliberation 
typically occurs at the branches’ regular meetings, where activists, ordinary party members, 
For a classic treatment of party branches, see Duverger 1954, pp. 17–39.34
Consider how the Austrian Social Democrats (SPÖ) define the functions of their local party branches: “We 35
inform the people in our area about political changes of all kinds. Above all, the branch (Sektion) is a 
place where people who live in the surrounding neighbourhood meet, talk to each other and help shape 
their environment.” Available at <http://www.sektion.at/index.php?article_id=105>.
As Clark (2004, p. 40) notes, “articulating interests to a local party can therefore be a way of getting an issue 36
into the forefront of debate.”
Scarrow 2014.37
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and some party officials convene to discuss local issues and current politics. These meetings 
are likely to exhibit characteristics that are typically thought to promote good deliberation, 
namely (1) a relative equality of opportunities to influence the deliberative process and (2) a 
relative diversity of viewpoints which ensures that issues are considered from multiple 
angles.  38
 Let me explain why I think party branches can be expected to display these features. 
First, participants in party branch meetings may enjoy relative equality because social status 
differences are typically diluted in a partisan context. Membership in parties can equalise 
status inequalities by giving people of less advantaged social backgrounds the opportunity to 
engage in politics as equals.  This means not only that membership in a party gives 39
underprivileged people an equal standing with their political adversaries (that too, worker’s 
parties being the obvious example here). Party membership is also a source of equality 
among allies. More particularly, it is the partisanship—the identification as part of a 
collective promoting shared political and social goals—in party membership from which a 
sense of equality and solidarity with fellow party members flows. Nancy Rosenblum 
endorses this view of partisanship. Partisanship, she argues, is a distinctive form of collective 
identity characterised by an “avowed connection to what ‘people like me’ value, think, and do 
politically.”  It is about recognition for those one stands together with in the political 40
struggle, and about a sense of being at home with those people. In party branches, this sense 
of “being at home” is further reinforced by the fact that members know each other well. A 
result of their regular meetings and their joint engagement in the local community, they will 
On these criteria, see Mansbridge et al. (2010, pp. 65–9).38
Cohen 1989, p. 31.39
Rosenblum 2008, p. 344.40
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be familiar with each other’s backgrounds and personal histories, and friendships will have 
germinated over time. 
 If all this is correct, then deliberations in party branches are deliberations among 
“people like us”—equal, open, and empathetic. Even if there are some social and economic 
status inequalities among participants, mutual recognition and acknowledgement ensures that 
their voices have equal weight. Elements of the “ethical partisanship” I have mentioned in the 
prior section may well be palpable in the party branches’ deliberations. 
 Moving now to the second feature, to what extent do participants in local party branch 
meetings exhibit a diversity of viewpoints? Is it not more likely that they hold rather similar 
views? After all, they are members of the same political party and based in the same local 
context. But still, this might not dramatically limit opinion diversity. On the one hand, most 
party branch members are not professional politicians, but politically committed lay citizens 
who pursue different kinds of professions; and their individual occupational backgrounds and 
corresponding everyday experiences are likely to result in a plurality of perspectives.  On 41
the other hand, opinion diversity may also be a consequence of age differences between the 
members. For example, young partisans who have just started their work in the party in the 
local district might enthusiastically promote new ideas, whilst older members may be more 
concerned with protecting what has been accomplished. These kinds of conflict are 
particularly likely to occur in large and established parties where the average age of party 
members tends to be higher than the average age of the population in large. Empirical studies 
reveal that, especially in traditional parties on the left, older members often hold more 
Compare also empirical evidence showing that party members generally become more and more like members 41
of the wider citizenry (Scarrow and Gezgor 2010).
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traditional (that is, more leftist) views than younger members. Some of these older members 
even see themselves as ideologically at odds with the rest of their party.   42
  To be clear, I do not mean to suggest that all local party branches one finds across 
Western democracies will exhibit the just-described characteristics. Party branches are 
diverse and some of them may indeed have serious deliberative defects—they may, for 
example, be colonised by strongly polarised party members who deliberately ignore facts that 
support alternative positions. All I am claiming is that, given the tendency of these groups to 
be socio-economically diverse, and given the integrative force of partisanship, party branches 
are overall likely to be promising sites of intra-party deliberation. 
 Someone might still object that the meetings of local party branches are more likely to 
produce loose everyday talk than serious political discussion. People attend these meetings to 
socialise with like-minded people, “talking about sports or having a summer picnic,” rather 
than to debate politics.  But though I do not want to deny that some of the activities of party 43
branches are non-deliberative (party branches, for example, often organise events for the 
local community, in which political debate often plays a minor role), that their members 
generally eschew political discussion is unlikely. Even if some members are less politicised 
than others, their shared political commitment will prompt regular political discussions, since 
it brings with it a heightened sensitivity to particular grievances in society as well as a sense 
of responsibility for resolving them.  44
Haute and Carty 2012.42
Katz 2013, pp. 52–3.43
Another point is that even if some of their exchanges do look like the reasoned deliberation theorists would 44
like to see flourishing, this might not imply that they do not contribute to deliberation in a wider, more 
systemic, sense. Evidence from empirical studies of deliberation suggests that even loose everyday talk 
can serve deliberative functions. As Conover and Searing (2005, p. 281) argue, it provides people with an 
opportunity to explore different arguments, try out justifications for their views and “develop confidence 
about performing in the public arena.”
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IV. THE SYSTEMIC UPTAKE OF DELIBERATION AT THE PARTY BASE 
Having established the deliberative credentials of local party branches, the next question is 
how the deliberations of these groups can be connected to substantive decisions. This section 
addresses this question, looking at mechanisms of delegation and accountability which 
normally should ensure the transmission of members’ deliberated preferences to the party 
elite. The section also canvasses novel institutional designs to make parties more deliberative 
if these mechanisms are defective. So we now shift the focus from the party base as a site of 
deliberation to the ways in which it interacts with the other components of the partisan 
deliberative system.  
A. Preference transmission, delegation, and accountability 
In most political parties, the party base is indirectly linked to decision-making authority. 
Typically grassroots members delegate to representatives at higher hierarchical levels of the 
party, just like voters delegate to MPs in elections. There are, essentially, two modes of intra-
party delegation. The first and more direct one is, indeed, candidate selection. How does 
candidate selection allow party branches to bring their deliberated views to bear on 
decisions? Mainly through selectorates. Those who select the candidates can influence later 
decisions by choosing candidates with whom they share views and values.  If selectorate 45
member A is also a member of a party branch—and this quite often the case, especially if the 
Empirical studies show that selectors tend to choose candidates according to this logic. As Gallagher (1988, p. 45
2) notes in a classic study of candidate selection practices, “the values of the selectorate … frequently 
have more impact than those of the voters.”
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method of candidate selection is decentralised —then her selection is likely to be influenced 46
by the deliberations of her branch. In a pre-selection meeting, for instance, the branch’s 
members may reach a reasoned agreement regarding which candidate to support, and commit 
A to select accordingly.  
 Furthermore, selected candidates may themselves be members of a party branch, and 
correspondingly ground their decisions in their branch’s deliberative judgments. 
Undoubtedly, this is the most direct way for party branches to influence policy decisions. It 
allows local deliberations to directly feed into the legislature. This is certainly not an 
unfamiliar scenario: in many parties the road to candidacy in legislative elections necessarily 
involves engagement at the local level, since the support of the local base is an important 
requirement to gain a place on the party list, and so some elected MPs will inevitably engage 
in a local branch. In this scenario, the members of the party branch can also hold their 
parliamentary delegate accountable by demanding explanations and justifications for her 
decisions in the group’s regular meetings, thus actualising a form of deliberative 
accountability.  47
 The second and more indirect mode of delegation is what I call multi-level delegation. 
By this I mean that elected delegates of the party branches carry the branches’ deliberative 
judgments to various assemblies at different levels of the party hierarchy, where they are 
either channelled into decisions or, alternatively, delegation proceeds to higher organisational 
levels. Multi-level delegation is a hallmark of parties that adopt a territorial organisational 
structure comprising several hierarchical organisational levels. Typically this form of 
Hazan and Rahat 2010, pp. 55–3.46
Note that a potential shortcoming in this scenario is that a single party branch would gain disproportionate 47
influence on policy decisions compared with those party branches, which have no elected representatives 
among their members.
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organisation implies that the membership is represented at all organisational levels by a 
members’ or delegates’ assembly, which is composed of or elected by the party membership, 
with the local and regional assemblies as well as the national party congress constituting “the 
supreme decision-making organs of the party at the respective organizational echelons.”  In 48
these assemblies, and in the party congress, the branches’ judgments are again made the 
subject of deliberative reappraisal.  In addition, delegates can be held accountable by the 49
branch members when they return from the assemblies. Similarly to cases where members of 
party branches hold a seat in the legislature, they can respond to their questions and explain 
them why decisions played out as they did.  
B. Empirical challenges to preference transmission 
These are the two standard ways for party branches to link their deliberations to decision-
making authority. To the extent that they permit communication flows between the party base 
and the decision-makers in the party, they can in principle provide the kind of linkage I have 
earlier singled out as desirable.  
 Once we consult the empirical literature on political parties, however, doubts arise as 
to whether these modes of delegation work sufficiently well to perform their linkage function. 
First, if multi-level delegation is to successfully connect the party branches’ deliberations to 
policy decisions across several hierarchical levels of the party, it needs to proceed largely 
bottom-up. (As I have said earlier, on my understanding this does not preclude leaving room 
Biezen and Piccio 2013, p. 43.48
See Pettitt’s (2007) account of internal dissent at the party congresses of the British Labour Party and the 49
Danish Socialist People’s Party. 
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for two-way communication between party elites and ordinary members, for instance, in 
party conferences.  But certain institutional checks are necessary to restrict the discretion of 50
the party elite, notably formal rules that require party elites to consider and take seriously the 
members’ judgments.) Otherwise the party branches’ deliberations are likely to be bypassed 
by more powerful actors in the party. In reality, however, parties seldom work in this way.  51
Even if party laws prescribe a bottom-up organisational structure (as is the case in many 
European countries), and even if the parties formally adopt such a structure, they are usually 
organised from the top down, or indeed stratarchically, as in Katz and Mair’s much-discussed 
cartel party model.  On the latter model, the relationship between party members and the 52
party leadership is in fact characterised by “mutual autonomy,” which is to say that the 
party’s different hierarchical levels are effectively decoupled from one another. At best, real 
existing parties “combine bottom-up and top-down government,” as a recent study of 
Norwegian parties shows.  But even in those cases the deliberative judgments of the party 53
base are often overruled by party elites. 
 Second, parties across Western democracies increasingly adopt candidate selection 
methods that shift power away from the party branches and activists to the passive and 
uninvolved membership (and sometimes even to non-members).  I have alluded to this 54
tendency in section II. According to one prominent commentator, this is “one of the most 
Pettitt 2007.50
Houten 2009.51
Katz and Mair 1995 and 2009.52
Allern and Saglie 2012, p. 966.53
Hazan and Rahat 2010, pp. 39–44.54
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commonly distinct trends we see today”:  parties tend to make selectorates more inclusive, 55
which carries the aura of greater internal democratisation but often diminishes the influence 
of party branches and their activists on the selection of the candidates. For example, party 
primaries in several parties in Germany, New Zealand, and Finland formally incorporate all 
party members in the selectorate and thus concentrate the power over the party list in the 
hands of member cohorts who ordinarily engage little (or not at all) in the party, and in any 
case are more inclined to support the candidates nominated by the party leadership.  By 56
implication, this decreases the extent to which the deliberative judgments of party branches 
impact election candidates. In sum, the standard pathways of linking the deliberations of the 
party base to substantive decisions appear defective in most parties today. 
C. Making parties more deliberative 
More could be said on the adverse implications the current organisational reality of parties in 
developed democracies has on the channels of preference transmission connecting the 
grassroots with the legislature, but given space constraints I can only map a general trend 
here. This trend gives plenty of reason for scepticism concerning the capacity of real existing 
parties to make their branches’ deliberations consequential: organisational realities appear to 
undermine parties’ capacity for linkage. This raises the question of how linkage could be re-
established. How could one bring the deliberations of party branches to bear on policy 
decisions, despite the unfavourable institutional environment most parties provide today?  
Mair 1997, p. 149; see also Katz and Mair 2009, p. 759.55
Rahat 2013, p. 138.56
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 One way that is consistent with the propositions laid out so far would be to make 
increased use of deliberative institutional designs within parties. Recent years have seen a 
proliferation of these kinds of institutions—examples include Deliberative Polls, citizens 
juries, and other types of deliberative consultative fora—and it seems worthwhile to consider 
integrating them into parties, too. Rather than merely trying to make candidate selection 
methods more democratic, practitioners could avail themselves of a vast array of deliberative 
innovations.  
 In the final part of this section, I want to point out some possible institutional designs. 
Although mainly indicative, the following three proposals highlight ways in which parties 
could draw on their internal deliberative resources to strengthen the link between the 
members on the ground and the party elite. 
 The most obvious deliberative institutional design is what one may call a problem-
oriented forum.  This kind of forum is a specially established assembly for deliberation over 57
one or multiple predetermined issues. Problem-oriented fora could, for instance, convene the 
members of several randomly selected party branches in a larger deliberative setting to devise 
a strategy for the party in a particular policy field. They could make tasks like drafting a party 
or election manifesto a more collaborative and interactive exercise, and its results are likely 
to enjoy more legitimacy than if such tasks are left to a small elite. 
 An innovative approach to using party branches as problem-oriented fora has been 
taken by the Australian Labour Party (ALP). In December 2011, the ALP’s party conference 
has endorsed the establishment of issue-based branches, called Policy Action Caucuses 
Note that this proposition differs starkly from the partisan deliberative fora Hendriks and her colleagues 57
(2007) have examined. In contrast to these “stakeholder forums,” which include representatives of 
different businesses as well as advocacy groups, the type of fora I am proposing here convene only 
grassroots members of a single political party.
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(PACs). PACs are established and run by party members; setting them up requires thirty 
members. Once established, they “receive financial support and resources from the party in 
the same way as a geographic local branch, and [they are] entitled to convene meetings, 
policy forums and put policy motions to conference.”  This provides party members with an 58
opportunity to pool relevant knowledge relating to a particular issue and work out policy 
proposals. While the deliberative credentials of PACs have yet to be examined, it seems clear 
that issue-based fora of this kind are a vehicle of member empowerment that is much in line 
with the institutional recommendations put forward here.  
 Second, to handle bigger deliberative tasks, single fora could also be “networked.”  59
This design bears resemblance to the way in which internal sites of deliberation ideally 
interact in multi-level delegation. A partisan deliberative network would comprise a number 
of dispersed fora of deliberation within the party that are linked together. In such a network, 
local branches would form single nodes that address limited aspects of specific issues in their 
deliberations, perhaps with an eye to the demands of their local constituency. The information 
from each node would subsequently be channelled together so that their recommendations 
can guide decision-making in large. Upon concluding its deliberations, each branch could, for 
example, elect a delegate to a single national forum, which in its turn could pool all the 
deliberative judgments of the party branches across the country and work out a highly 
integrative decision. 
 Note that establishing partisan deliberative networks might not require much 
institutional effort. After all, according to much recent research, parties are in any case best 
conceived in terms of networks of partisans, that is, dispersed and decentralised systems of 
Gauja 2015, p. 98.58
On the idea of deliberative networks, see Rummens (2012).59
!27
interconnected partisan groups.  If this is true, then making these networks more deliberative 60
would involve simply improving the channels of communication that connect individual 
partisan groups, and coordinating their deliberations better. So, networked partisan 
deliberation might have plenty of pre-existing resources to build on. 
 The third and final institutional design I want to sketch here is a partisan deliberative 
conference. This type of deliberative assembly differs from the problem-oriented forum in 
that it brings grassroots members together with party elites rather than convening the 
members on their own. Its chief purpose is to strengthen accountability by promoting face-to-
face encounters between members and elites, in which they “ask questions and give answers, 
exploring whether or not they remain mutually aligned and whether the grounds of their 
alignment might have changed.”  Moreover, partisan deliberative conferences need not 61
result in immediate collective decisions. They could also only prepare the way for decisions 
that are taken at a later point in time, or be organised with a retrospective outlook to evaluate 
previously taken decisions.  
 One potential use of partisan deliberative conferences is to supplement direct 
democratic procedures. For example, the members’ conferences the German SPD organised 
in several federal states prior to its membership ballot on the coalition agreement with the 
CDU/CSU allowed large numbers of members and activists to debate the terms of the 
coalition pact face-to-face with the party leadership. In these conferences, the party 
leadership was compelled to explain the reasons for their support of the “grand coalition” and 
engage in two-way communication with the membership. While the party base in the end 
This topic has recently received special attention in research on party politics in the U.S., see for example 60
Desmarais et al. (2015). For a theoretical (and rather critical) statement on the “party as a network,” see 
Katz and Mair (2009, esp. pp. 761-762).
Mansbridge 2009, p. 384, fn. 57.61
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supported the coalition agreement, the initial resistance by segments of the membership 
(notably the JUSOS, the party’s youth organisation) which mobilised internal protest against 
the coalition, and the ensuing pressure on the leadership to more extensively justify the 
coalition agreement vis-à-vis the members, is indicative of the democratic potential of such 
conference-style fora. 
 A question that might be asked here is whether these institutional designs can be 
adopted by any party. Parties come, after all, in a variety of different forms, and it seems 
likely that different organisational features and programmatic commitments would affect the 
feasibility of internal deliberative democratisation. Absent in-depth empirical research on 
deliberation within parties, however, taking a definitive position regarding the compatibility 
of deliberative designs with different party types is difficult. But given the variegated 
contexts in which non-partisan deliberative designs proved to work, I think it should be 
possible to experiment with such institutional designs across different kinds of parties. A 
minimum condition would seem to be that their membership is organised to some degree.  
 Of course, some parties are generally much less deliberative than others, which 
naturally makes it more difficult for them to enact deliberative reforms. In authoritarian 
parties on the extreme fringes of the political system, for example, deliberation is likely to be 
of very low quality. Efforts to make these parties more internally deliberative are bound to 
fail. But in reality there in any case tends to be little demand for greater internal 
democratisation in parties of this kind. So, at least at the level of practical implementation, 
the question of whether or not the institutional designs proposed here are compatible with 
poorly deliberative parties might not be an issue we have to worry much about. 
 A final question that might be raised concerns the broader benefits of making parties 
more internally deliberative. What, apart from bringing citizens closer to government, might 
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parties gain from adopting deliberative institutional designs? There are at least three possible 
positive consequences, to which I want to briefly allude as this section draws to a close. First, 
and most importantly, revitalising the linkage function of political parties through 
deliberative designs might help counteract the decline of party that so many commentators 
complain about. Much has been written in recent times about the increasing disengagement 
from partisan politics, growing dissatisfaction with and distrust in parties, problems of 
accountability and responsiveness, and so on.  Reorienting parties towards their partisan 62
base (and through their base towards the citizens) using the kind of institutions I have 
outlined in this article could work against these corrosive trends. Empowered deliberative 
participatory opportunities for party members could restore popular trust in the willingness of 
parties to take seriously the judgments of the citizens on the ground, and correspondingly 
provide an incentive to engage more in parties. Perhaps the decline of party could not be fully 
reversed with the help of deliberative designs: after all, the just-described trends are not only 
the result of organisational failure, but also have to do with the loosening of class identities 
and the changing structure of the capitalist economy.  But even if internal deliberative 63
democratisation is no panacea, it could certainly strengthen citizens’ belief in the worth of 
engaging with collective political agency. 
 Second, and relatedly, bringing the deliberated views of the party base to bear on the 
party agenda could over time sharpen a party’s distinctive partisan profile. It is often 
lamented (especially in Europe) that parties have become virtually indistinguishable from one 
See, paradigmatically, Mair (2013a).62
On the relationship between party decline and capitalism, see Streeck (2014).63
!30
another and, thus, fail to offer citizens real political choice.  An empowered membership 64
could counteract this tendency. Especially in centre-left parties, where ordinary members 
often hold significantly more leftist views than the party elite,  increasing the members’ 65
impact on decisions might lead to a programmatic re-positioning that heralds a renewed 
capacity to offer voters a credible alternative. 
 Finally, some of the deliberative institutions I have outlined could powerfully aid the 
flourishing of transnational partisanship. Still a relatively under-theorised idea, transnational 
partisanship denotes cooperation of like-minded partisans across national borders. Its 
normative point is to connect what would otherwise remain separate political spheres in the 
pursuit of transnational political projects.  While this has often been an enterprise of party 66
elites, partisan deliberative networks would seem well-equipped to transnationalise grassroots 
partisanship. Such networks could be created to pool knowledge from partisans of several 
countries. For example, Europarties could use them to draft a unified manifesto for European 
Parliament elections. In such a set-up, designated fora of the respective national parties would 
form the networks’ single nodes; and these fora would in turn send delegates to a pan-
European partisan forum.  It is innovations of this kind that deliberative institutional designs 67
make thinkable. So there can be no doubt that parties, and indeed democracy more generally, 
could profit from the suggested deliberative reforms in a variety of ways. 
The standard argument, here in the words of David Beetham (2011, p. 127), is this: “The disintegration of 64
traditional social bases combined with the reduction of ideological differences under the pressure of 
economic neo-liberalism has made mainstream parties increasingly indistinguishable from each other, 
and less vote-worthy as a consequence.”
Haute and Carty 2012.65
White 2014, esp. pp. 390–3.66
Of course, language differences can complicate deliberation in a transnational partisan forum. Evidence from 67
fora of this kind (like the European Social Forum) shows however that these barriers can be overcome 
using professional translators (Doerr 2012).
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V. DELIBERATIVE PARTIES IN THE AGE OF PARTY DECLINE 
That concludes my discussion of a deliberative model of intra-party democracy. But although 
I have responded to a number of objections throughout the article, it might still be worried 
that some of the arguments I have laid out are ultimately too optimistic. Sceptics might argue, 
for example, that the near universal decline of party memberships across democratic 
countries puts the possibility of internally deliberative parties out of reach.  Absent active 68
members, it may be said, turning parties into deliberative assemblies in which reasoned 
collective judgments emerge from the membership base is illusory. Too thinned out and 
fragmented is the membership at the local level to be meaningfully involved in the party.  
 But whether it is inferred from this that intra-party democracy is generally 
superfluous, or that parties should involve more non-members into their democratic 
procedures (for instance, through candidate selection methods that include unaffiliated 
supporters), arguments of this kind lack persuasive force. Empirically, one should be cautious 
with overstating the decline of party memberships. Of course, membership parties are not 
what they once were. But their decline is not absolute in the sense that there are no active 
members left in today’s parties.  Normatively, and this is the more important point, 69
bypassing existing active members on the grounds that they are fewer than in the past appears 
Biezen et al. 2012; Mair 2013a.68
In fact, several recent studies of party members suggest that “traditional party membership is far from 69
obsolete” (Scarrow 2014, p. 216). Although party membership figures declined in the last two decades, 
the number of politically active partisans remained surprisingly consistent (Ponce and Scarrow, 
forthcoming).
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democratically suspect: indeed, providing them with inclusive channels to participate has a 
moral claim as a way of recognising their democratic political equality. 
 A second challenge arises from what Peter Mair has called the growing tension 
between the “demands of responsiveness” and the “demands of responsibility.”  Parties, so 70
the argument goes, are subject to increasing pressure from lobbyist and special interests as 
well as supranational or international bodies that “have a right to be heard and, indeed, the 
authority to insist,” and this makes it more and more difficult for them to respond to the 
demands of their members.  In Europe, for example, the EU level has assumed responsibility 71
in a large number of policy fields, which naturally limits the scope of policy goals parties can 
realistically pursue.  Thus one may say that irrespective of what the members decide in their 72
deliberations, party leaders lack the discretion to translate these decisions into policies. 
 The problem here is similar to the problem facing parties with regard to their voters: 
institutional constraints reduce the range of policies that can be offered and pursued. But that 
does not tell against intra-party democracy. Always there are practical limitations that apply 
to realising political goals, without it following that seeking to attain these be fruitless. 
Indeed, even if party leaders are bound only to achieve partially integrative agreements in 
their policy negotiations, that they seek to represent the demands of the membership (as well 
as their constituents) would seem a minimal condition for citizens to exercise collective 
political agency. Such is, in fact, the very rationale and justification for intra-party 
democracy, as I have argued at the outset of the article. 
Mair 2013b.70
Ibid., p. 145.71
Rose 2014.72
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 So to sum up, a deliberative model of intra-party democracy faces a number of 
challenges, though none which would fatally compromise the possibilities of it being 
realised. Doubts are warranted in light of the dire state of parties in Western democracies, but 
to see their gradual decline as a reason to give up on their potential to bring citizens closer to 
government amounts to questioning whether democracy as such is thinkable. Surely, when it 
comes to making parties more internally deliberative, still much depends on political will. 
Especially the implementation of deliberative institutional designs within parties would 
require party elites to renounce some of their authority, and one may reasonably doubt 
whether they would readily do so. But these are ultimately secondary points, none of which 
undermine the potential of the model suggested here. Making parties more internally 
democratic requires making them also more internally deliberative. 
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